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ABSTRACT
Auditor Changes and Debt Financing: Evidence from China
by
CHAN Suet Ying
Master of Philosophy
The role of independent auditors is to ensure the accuracy and the credibility
of the financial statements. Independent auditors help in reducing agency costs
and serve as a monitoring function for creditors. A change in an auditor–client
relationship may provide useful information to creditors. Creditors may
consider the signal of auditor changes, which affects information risks, as a
factor in determining the terms of debts. After several major audit scandals,
awareness of the importance of audit quality has increased. Audit partner
changes and audit firm changes have been implemented in some jurisdictions
to enhance the audit quality. Since China requires disclosure by signing
partners’ names on audit reports, audit partner rotations can be identified. The
direction of audit firm changes can be downward, lateral, and upward audit
firm changes. In this thesis, the effects on debt financing of auditor changes at
both audit firm and audit partner levels in different directions are
comprehensively investigated. This thesis addresses the importance of
understanding the association between audit firm/ partner changes and debt
financing. I find that, overall, auditor changes worsen debt financing in various
situations. The findings of this thesis should have important implications for
investors, corporate financial managers, and regulators.
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Auditor Changes and Debt Financing: Evidence from China
Chapter 1. Introduction
Independent auditors play an important role in ascertaining the accuracy and
reliability of financial statements. A relatively long auditor–client relationship
involves less financial reporting uncertainty, which may lead to higher-quality
audits and a lower cost of financing. Conversely, a prolonged auditor tenure
may compromise auditor independence. If auditor changes induce uncertainty,
leading to an increase in information risks, creditors may require stricter loan
terms for companies with auditor changes. This thesis investigates whether
auditor changes provide useful information to creditors that will affect the
terms of debt for companies with auditor changes. There are two types of
auditor changes: voluntary and mandatory. There are also different directions
of audit firm changes, including upward, lateral, and downward changes. First,
I examine whether, what, and how changes in auditors affect debt financing.
Second, I investigate the effect of a change in auditor on debt financing
without changes in audit quality (i.e. a change in an auditor without a change
in an audit firm). Third, I examine whether a change in audit firm, without a
change in auditors, affects debt financing. The last situation is rather unique in
the Chinese setting, in which the audit partner remains the same, even when
he/she moves to another audit firm. The emphasis on personal relationships in
business dealings in Chinese society may explain this arrangement (Kriz and
Keating 2010). This thesis includes whether there is any impact of such special
auditor changes on debt financing.
This thesis is motivated by the importance of audit quality in reducing
agency problems. The Big 4 auditors provide higher quality audits than
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non-Big 4 auditors do (DeAngelo 1981). Retaining Big N auditors helps to
enhance the reliability and credibility of financial statements, which reduces
monitoring costs (Pittman and Fortin 2004). Lenders perceive companies that
employ reputed auditors as more trustworthy, resulting in a lower cost of debt
(Pittman and Fortin 2004). In this thesis, I define audit firm changes from
non-Big N to Big N and vice versa as upward and downward changes,
respectively. I define other changes as lateral changes.
Second, this thesis is motivated by the importance of debt financing in
China. Debt rose from 160% of gross domestic product (GDP) in 2005 to
247% in 2015, with bank debt accounting for 19% of GDP in 2015 (Sun 2016).
Loans granted by banks in China rose from 27.8 trillion yuan in 2007 to 86.79
trillion yuan in 2014 (The Statistics Portal 2017). The leverage ratio of listed
non-financial firms in China rose from around 0.47 in 2002 to around 0.60 in
2014 (Zhang, Han, Ng, and Chan 2015).
Finally, this thesis is motivated by the importance of understanding the
relationship between audit firm/partner changes and debt financing. More
restrictive terms of debt for companies with auditor changes affects their
financial performance. Therefore, the findings of the thesis should have
important implications for investors, corporate financial managers, and
regulators.
Given data availability, this study examines inside collateral and loan
maturity as the terms of debt. Creditors consider default risks of companies
when issuing debts. If companies cannot repay their debt, they must use
collateral to offset it. Loans that require collateral and have shorter maturity
imply stricter debt terms. I do not examine loan spread in this study due to
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Chinese firms’ limited disclosure of this information.
Researchers investigated how auditor changes may affect the cost of equity.
However, the results are inconclusive. Some find negative market responses to
auditor changes (Menon and Williams 2008; Shu 2000; Weiss and Kalbers
2013), while others fail to find such a relationship (Beneish, Hopkins, Jansen,
and Martin 2005; Klock 1994). This thesis investigates whether the debt
market provides a clearer response related to a change in an auditor–client
relationship.
Banks have superior access to private information relative to public debt
holders (Bharath, Sunder, and Sunder 2008; Cole 1998). If auditor changes are
associated with a change in loan terms, then this implies that auditor changes
are useful, even for these informed creditors. This implication also stresses the
importance of increased disclosure of auditor changes (e.g., detailed reasons
and the circumstances of the change). China implemented mandatory audit
partner and firm rotations, and therefore, apart from considering voluntary
auditor changes as in existing literature, this thesis also considers the effects of
mandatory auditor changes due to the regulatory policy on debt financing in
China. This approach gives us a more complete analysis of the effects of
different types of auditor changes on debt financing.
I collect the sample of Chinese main-board A-share firm-year observations
from 2007–2014 from the China Stock Market and Accounting Research
(CSMAR) database. The study period commences in 2007 because China
formally adopted the International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS) in
this year. I use logistic and linear regressions to examine the effects of the
aforementioned changes on debt financing.
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I find evidence that an audit partner change without a change in an audit
firm worsens debt financing. Further, downward and lateral changes in audit
firm also worsen debt financing. These results suggest that the information
risks associated with auditor changes dominate the perceived increase in
auditor independence. Further, I find evidence that maintaining the same audit
partner after the audit partner moves to another firm worsens debt financing.
This thesis offers several contributions to the existing literature. First, no
study has thus far focused on China, which is important in the debt financing
market as explained earlier. Second, there is no study on the effect of audit
partner changes on debt financing. The US Public Company Accounting
Oversight Board requires disclosure of the name of the engagement partner for
all public company audits issued on or after January 31, 2017. Therefore,
research data for audit partner rotation are currently not available for U.S.
public companies. Thus, due to data availability, I examine how audit partner
and audit firm rotations affect debt financing in China. The disclosure of
auditors’ names on audit reports allows an identification of audit partner
rotations. The impact of auditor changes at different levels (firm and partner)
and the direction of changes on debt financing can be examined
comprehensively for the first time. Third, no study considers how personal
relationships affect debt financing. In China, the audit partner often remains
unchanged for a listed company, even when that audit partner moves to
another audit firm. This kind of “auditor change” represents about 7% of the
auditor changes in China. As mentioned earlier, the Chinese place more
emphasis on personal relationships. In this thesis, I also examine this
phenomenon to see how it affects debt financing.
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The remainder of this thesis proceeds as follows. Chapter 2 describes the
relevant institutional background in China, provides a review of the literature
and develops the research hypotheses. Chapter 3 presents the research methods.
Chapter 4 discusses the empirical results. Chapter 5 presents the sensitivity
tests. Chapter 6 concludes and discusses limitations and future research.
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Chapter 2. Institutional Background, Literature Review and Hypotheses
Development
2.1 Institutional Background
2.1.1 Regulations covering audit quality and auditor changes in China
Mandatory rotations of audit partners and audit firms
The Enron/Arthur Andersen scandal raised global concerns about auditor
independence and the need for an appropriate regulatory policy to enhance
audit quality. Many jurisdictions adopted mandatory audit partner and/or audit
firm rotations to maintain auditor independence and reduce the familiarity
threat. Mandatory audit partner rotation is more common than mandatory audit
firm rotation worldwide. For example, The U.S. and Australia implemented
mandatory audit partner rotation every 5 years. The U.K. requires audit partner
and audit firm rotation every 5 and 10 years, respectively. Table 1 summarizes
the regulations related to audit partner and firm rotations in different
jurisdictions.
(Insert Table 1 here)

In China, the China Securities Regulatory Commission (CSRC) and the
Ministry of Finance (MOF) jointly issued a policy in October 2003 that
prohibits signing partners from providing audit services for the same listed
entity for more than five consecutive years and the signing auditors cannot
resume audit services for the firm within two years. In addition, signing
auditors cannot provide audit services for more than two consecutive years for
the same initial public offering entity (IPO). The regulations took effect on 1
January 2004 (Firth, Rui, and Wu 2012).
Apart from implementing mandatory audit partner rotation to maintain
6

auditor independence for listed entities, in 2005, the State-owned Assets
Supervision and Administration Commission of the State Council (SASAC)
required that each Chinese state-owned enterprise (SOE) switches its existing
audit firm to a new audit firm if the existing audit firm has served the company
for five consecutive years (Firth, Rui, and Wu 2012).

2.1.2 Debt market in China
China’s total debt has increased steadily since the global financial crisis. In
China, total debt rose 465% over the past decade (Sun 2016). China’s debt
grew to 247% of gross domestic product in 2015, from 160% in 2005, of
which bank debt accounted for 19% of GDP in 2015 (Sun 2016). The leverage
ratio grew from around 0.47 in 2002 to around 0.60 in 2014 for listed
non-financial firms in China (Zhang, Han, Ng, and Chan 2015). This indicates
the growing importance of debt markets in China. In China, the proportion of
internal financing is relatively low, while the proportion of external financing
is about 80% to 90% (Luo 2011). External financing includes equity and debt
financing. Large firms in China favor debt financing (Chen, Jiang, and Lin
2014): firms in the real estate industry borrow relatively more debt and firms
in the manufacturing and utility industries use more long-term debt (Chen,
Jiang, and Lin 2014). The leverage ratios for companies in the real estate and
construction industries were consistently higher at the industry level from
2007 to 2014, reaching 0.8 in 2014 (Roberts and Zurawski 2016).
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2.2 Literature Review and Hypotheses Development
2.2.1 Audit quality
Extant studies exclusively studied the difference in audit quality between
Big 4 and non-Big 4 auditors. Based on a variety of audit-quality proxies,
researchers find evidence suggesting that Big 4 audit firms provide higher
quality audits than non-Big 4 audit firms do (Becker, DeFond, Jiambalvo, and
Subramanyam 1998; Khurana and Raman 2004; Palmrose 1988). Big 4 audit
firms have more incentives to provide higher quality audit services to maintain
their reputation (DeAngelo 1981; Francis and Wilson 1988). Big 4 audit firms
have more motivation to ensure the credibility of their clients’ financial
statements to avoid litigation exposure (Khurana and Raman 2004). Audit
clients with higher agency conflicts are more likely to choose reputed audit
firms to adopt credible monitoring (DeFond 1992). I therefore expect higher
audit quality for Big N firms than for non-Big N firms. The audit quality of
audit partners within an audit firm should be similar because audit partners in
the same firm usually have similar audit competence under the same quality
control system.

2.2.2 Auditor rotations and audit quality
Prior studies document that auditors play an important role in ensuring the
credibility and accuracy of financial statements, to reduce the corporate
agency problems, and hence lower the cost of equity capital (Fernando,
Abdel-Meguid, and Elder 2010; Francis, LaFond, Olsson, and Schipper 2005).
Other studies also show that auditor rotations can help to maintain auditors’
independence and objectivity (Gietzmann and Sen 2002; Hussey and Lan
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2001). However, auditor changes serve as a “red flag” that financial reporting
uncertainties will be higher (Lu 2006). If there is a disruption in an
auditor-client relationship at the audit firm level, external users of financial
statements will suspect that the auditor’s monitoring function may be
compromised, which can increase firms’ information risks (Menon and
Williams 2008).
Since switching to a new auditor involves a high start-up cost, voluntary
audit partner and audit firm changes provide signals to creditors that the
companies are opinions shopping (Matsumura, Subramanyam, and Tucker
1997). If the incumbent auditor issues a qualified audit opinion to a company,
the company wants to switch to another audit firm that the company will have
more influence on the auditors to have a better audit opinion (Chow and Rice
1982).
Apart from the signal of opinion shopping, auditor changes causes a loss of
existing auditors’ cumulative knowledge of the companies and hence can
lower the audit quality (Sayyar, Basiruddin, Zaleha Abdul Rasid, and Sayyar
2014).
Extant research studies find that the effects of audit partner rotation on audit
quality are mixed. Fargher, Lee, and Mande (2008) find that there is a positive
relationship between audit partner changes and audit quality in the Australian
setting which use abnormal accruals as a proxy for audit quality. They suggest
audit quality increases after audit partner rotations because of the increased
independence to the audit engagement. However, Chen, Lin, and Lin (2008)
find that audit quality deteriorates after audit partners switch using
discretionary accruals as a proxy for earnings quality. Audit quality and the
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length of auditor tenure are positively related because of the reduced
information asymmetry between auditors and audit clients (Solomon, Shield,
and Whittington 1999). Chen, Peng, Xue, Yang, and Ye (2016) suggest that
companies also engage in partner-level opinion shopping by seeking another
partner who is more willing to give them a clean opinion. Audit clients are
more likely to engage in successful partner-level opinion shopping if they are
economically essential to the audit firm. Therefore, in this situation, auditors’
monitoring function will be compromised, which leads to higher information
risks and uncertainties.
Since China requires a disclosure of signing partners’ names on audit reports,
creditors should be able to discover mandatory audit partner changes by
examining the disclosure over time. Since audit reports also disclose audit
firms, creditors can also detect mandatory audit firm changes for SOEs by
examining the disclosure over time.
Mandatory auditor rotations, either at partner or firm levels, aim to increase
auditor independence, reduce over the familiarity and self-interest threats to
enhance audit quality at the expense of a loss of current auditor’s cumulative
knowledge of the company (Ghosh and Moon 2005; Mansi, Maxwell, and
Miller 2004). Kwon, Lim, and Simnett (2014) find that audit quality measured
by abnormal discretionary accrual does not significantly change with
mandatory audit firm rotation in the South Korean setting. Firth, Rui, and Wu
(2012) also find that mandatory auditor changes at both the audit partner and
audit firm levels provide fresh perspectives, but leads to a loss of current
auditors’ accumulated knowledge of the client’s auditing process, which will
increase financial reporting risks. The disadvantages offset the perceived
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benefits; thus, empirically, the net effects of mandatory auditor rotations at
both levels are not clear.

2.2.3 Audit quality and the cost of debt
Higher-quality audits can reduce financial information uncertainties for
lenders and thus enhance the efficiency of debt contracting (Jensen and
Meckling 1976). Creditors may perceive that companies audited by Big N
audit firms have higher-quality audits, which reduces information asymmetry
between creditors and firm managers. Consequently, companies with
higher-quality audits will have a lower cost of debt (Causholli and Knechel
2012). Retaining Big-N auditors enhances the reliability and credibility of
financial statements, which reduces monitoring costs (Pittman and Fortin
2004). Lenders perceive companies employing auditors with a higher
reputation as more trustworthy (Pittman and Fortin 2004). There is a negative
relationship between Big 4 audits and the cost of debt. Companies with
modified audit opinions are associated with a higher cost of debt (Karjalainen
2011). Therefore, higher-quality audits should generally have a lower cost of
debt. Francis, Hunter, Robinson, Robinson, and Yuan (2016) find that
voluntary auditor changes provide a signal to creditors that companies are
“opinion shopping” and implies a higher information risk. Thus, loan spreads
should increase after auditor changes.
With higher information risks but essentially the same audit quality controls,
I expect that a voluntary audit partner change without an audit firm change and
lateral changes in audit firms will worsen debt financing. I also expect that the
audit quality for voluntary audit firm changes in the downward direction will
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be lower. Therefore, voluntary audit firms in downward changes should
worsen debt financing. Finally, although voluntary audit firm rotations may
induce higher information risks that may impair audit quality, Big N audit
firms usually provide better audit services because they have more competent
staff and more comprehensive accounting systems (Behn, Choi, and Kang
2008). Thus, the effect of a voluntary audit firm change in an upward direction
(i.e., from non-Big N to Big N) on debt financing is uncertain. The net effects
of mandatory auditor rotations at both audit firm and audit partner levels are
not clear.
As a result, I formulate the following hypotheses.

2.2.4 Hypotheses
Considering the combined effect of voluntary and mandatory audit firm
changes, the impact of an audit firm change in an upward direction on debt
financing is uncertain.
𝑯𝑯𝟏𝟏 : Upward audit firm changes will lead to a change in debt financing.

Considering the combined effect of voluntary and mandatory audit firm

changes, downward audit firm changes will worsen debt financing because
voluntary downward changes will worsen debt financing, while the effect of
mandatory changes on debt financing is uncertain.
𝑯𝑯𝟐𝟐 : Downward audit firm changes will worsen debt financing.

Considering the effects of voluntary and mandatory changes, lateral audit

firm changes will worsen debt financing because voluntary lateral changes will
worsen debt financing, while the effect of mandatory audit firm changes is
uncertain.
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𝑯𝑯𝟑𝟑 : Lateral audit firm changes will worsen debt financing.

Considering the effects of voluntary and mandatory changes, an audit

partner change without an audit firm change will worsen debt financing
because a voluntary audit partner change without a change in an audit firm
will worsen debt financing, while the effect of mandatory audit partner
changes on debt financing is uncertain.
𝑯𝑯𝟒𝟒 : An audit partner change without an audit firm change will worsen
debt financing.

When the audit partner remains the same for a listed company, even the
partner changes to another audit firm, I expect a worsening of debt financing
because creditors will question the intention of this special arrangement. Since
creditors consider that this change will increase the information risks and
familiarity threat, this situation should worsen debt financing.
𝑯𝑯𝟓𝟓 : Keeping the same audit partner while changing the audit firm will
worsen debt financing.
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Chapter 3. Research Methods
3.1 Data collection
The sample of the Chinese main-board, non-financial, A-share firm-year
observations from 2007-2014 have been collected from the China Stock
Market and Accounting Research (CSMAR) database. I also collect
information from other sources such as websites of the listed companies. I start
from 2007 because that is the year when the International Financial Reporting
Standards (IFRS) was formally adopted in China. Sample firms without bank
debts are excluded in the sample. Firms in the financial sector are also
excluded in the sample because of their special reporting requirements. I start
with 15,076 non-financial year-observations and reduce to 4,353 because of no
bank debts and financial data.

3.2 Statistical model
To test the hypotheses, I use collateral as the dependent variable. Loan
spread is not chosen due to the limited disclosure of this information by
Chinese listed companies. Collateral is used to repay the debt in case the
company fails to repay the debt. The common forms of collateral in China
include land use right and real estate. Therefore, a loan obligation that requires
collateral implies a stricter loan term. I use logistic regression to test the
hypotheses.

Collateral = 𝛽𝛽0 + 𝛽𝛽1Firm_Up + 𝛽𝛽2Firm_Down + 𝛽𝛽3Firm_Lateral +
𝛽𝛽4 Man_Firm_Change + 𝛽𝛽5 Partner_Change + Control +ε

(1)
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Collateral = 𝛽𝛽0 + 𝛽𝛽1Partner_Change_Firm_NoChange +
𝛽𝛽2Man_Partner_Change + Control +ε
(2)

Collateral = 𝛽𝛽0 + 𝛽𝛽1Partner_NoChange_Firm_Change +
𝛽𝛽2Man_Firm_Change + Control+ε
(3)

Collateral is coded as one if bank debt is backed by any collaterals and is
coded as zero otherwise. Having collateral in the loan obligation implies a
stricter loan term and an auditor’s assessment of a higher risk transaction.
Firm_Up is coded as one if an audit firm changes from non-Big N to Big N
and zero otherwise. Firm_Down is coded as one if an audit firm changes from
Big N to non-Big N and zero otherwise. Firm_Lateral is coded as one if an
audit firm changes from Big N to Big N and non-Big N to non-Big N and zero
otherwise. All the above audit firm changes include both voluntary and
mandatory audit firm rotations. Partner_Change_Firm_NoChange is coded as
one in the situation that an audit partner change without an audit firm change
and zero for no change in an audit firm and no change in audit partners.
Partner_NoChange_Firm_Change is coded as one in the situation where there
is no change in audit partners but there is an audit firm change and zero for no
change in an audit firm and no change in audit partners. Man_Firm_Change is
coded as one if there is a mandatory audit firm change and zero otherwise.
Man_Partner_Change is coded as one if there is a mandatory audit partner
change and zero otherwise. Partner_Change is coded as one if there is an audit
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partner change and zero otherwise.
If the audit firm is not the same as the one in the previous year, a rotation of
audit firm is identified. I identify mandatory audit firm rotation if the audit
firm has reached the maximum number of years serving a listed company set
by the regulation. Merger between firms is also regarded as a mandatory audit
firm rotation. If any one of the signing partners changes in year t from year t-1,
I identify a rotation of audit partner. I identify mandatory audit partner rotation
if the audit partner has reached the maximum number of years serving as a
listed company set by the regulation.
Equation (1) is used to test for Hypotheses (1), (2), and (3). In the thesis,
Big N firms include Big 4 (PricewaterhouseCoopers, KPMG, Ernst & Young,
and Deloitte Touche Tohmatsu) and BDO. Since BDO ranked fourth in China
based on the ranking released by the Chinese Institute of Certified Public
Accountants (CICPA) in 2014, it is reasonable to include BDO as one of the
Big N audit firms. BDO has gained reputation and provided high-quality
services similar to the Big 4 audit firms. If an audit firm is changed from
non-Big N to Big N, this change is regarded as an upward change and vice
versa. Other audit firm changes are regarded as lateral audit firm changes.
Since there are situations where there is no change in audit partners, but there
is an audit firm change, the audit partner change is added in the Equation (1) to
control the effect of the audit partner rotation. Equation (2) is used to test for
Hypothesis (4) and Equation (3) is used to test for Hypothesis (5).
Control variables in regression models include Prior_MAO, Age, Leverage,
Loan_Size, Current_Ratio, CFO, Industry_Dummy, and Year dummies.
Prior_MAO is coded as one if the company received modified audit opinion in
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the previous year and zero otherwise. Prior_MAO is expected to be positively
related to loan terms (Firth, Rui, and Wu 2012; Francis, Hunter, Robinson,
Robinson, and Yuan 2016). A company with a modified audit opinion in the
previous year is expected to have higher litigation and audit risks, and poorer
financial performances than other companies. The ability of repaying debts for
those companies with a modified audit opinion in the previous year will be
lowered. Thus, creditors will require collateral in their loan obligations. Age is
the number of years since the company has been listed. Age is expected to be
positively related to loan terms, as older firms are more likely to have
exhausted the capital since listed, resulting in a higher chance of financial
distress (Firth, Rui, and Wu 2012). Leverage is calculated with the total
liabilities to total assets ratio. Leverage is expected to be positively associated
with loan terms. It measures the ability of a company to repay the debt and the
capacity to resist the external shocks. Higher leverage involves higher default
risks, therefore, creditors will require collateral for those companies with
higher leverage ratios (Bacha 2014; Firth, Rui, and Wu 2012; Pittman and
Fortin 2004; Francis, Hunter, Robinson, Robinson, and Yuan 2016). Loan_Size
is a natural logarithm of the loan size. Loan_Size is expected to be negatively
related to loan terms, as borrowers with low default risks are able to borrow
more debts (Yu 2005). CFO is cash flows from operations scaled by total
assets. CFO is expected to be negatively associated with loan terms.
Companies with higher CFO imply they have a higher flexibility of the usage
of cash flows. Companies with more cash are expected to have a lower risk of
default (Pittman and Fortin 2004). Current_Ratio is current assets to current
liabilities ratio. Current_Ratio is expected to be negatively associated with
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loan terms. Companies with a higher liquidity are expected to have a lower
risk of bankruptcy and have a higher ability to repay the debt (Oh, Park and
Hong 2016). Industry_Dummy is coded as one if a company is in the
manufacturing sector and zero otherwise. Manufacturing companies and
non-manufacturing companies are different in terms of business nature,
business environment, and assets structure. Year dummies are also included in
the regression models.
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Chapter 4. Empirical Results
4.1 Descriptive statistics
Table 2 Panel A presents descriptive statistics for the dependent variable and
all the independent variables in Equation (1). Seventy-one percent of the
sample firm years have collateral in their loans. Among different types of audit
firm changes, most of the audit firm changes are lateral audit firm changes,
which are about sixteen percent, while upward audit firm changes and
downward audit firm changes are about one percent and one percent
respectively.
(Insert Table 2 Panel A here)

Table 2 Panel B presents descriptive statistics for the dependent variable and
all the independent variables in Equation (2). Sixty-nine percent of the sample
firm years have collateral in their loans. The situation of an audit partner
change without an audit firm change is about fifty-five percent of the sample
firm years.
(Insert Table 2 Panel B here)

Table 2 Panel C presents descriptive statistics for the dependent variable and
all the independent variables in Equation (3). Sixty-eight percent of the sample
firm years have collateral in their loans. The situation of no change in audit
partners, but an audit firm change is about eleven percent of the sample firm
years.
(Insert Table 2 Panel C here)
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4.2 Correlation Matrix
Table 3 Panel A shows the Pearson correlation matrix for the dependent
variable and all independent variables in Equation (1). I find that downward
audit firm change, lateral audit firm change, and audit partner change are
positively and significantly related to collateral. However, I find no significant
correlation between mandatory audit firm rotation and collateral. Age and
Leverage are positively and significantly correlated with collateral. Loan_Size,
CFO, and Current_Ratio are negatively and significantly correlated with
collateral. The direction of all these independent variables is consistent with
prior studies. The correlations among most of the independent variables are
less than 0.5. The correlation coefficient above 0.5 includes -0.599 (Age and
Industry_Dummy). The highest variance inflation factor is 1.865. Therefore,
multicollinearity should not be a problem in the regression.
(Insert Table 3 Panel A here)

Table 3 Panel B shows the Pearson correlation matrix for the dependent
variable and all independent variables in Equation (2). I find that an audit
partner change without an audit firm change is positively and significantly
correlated to collateral. However, I find no significant correlation between
mandatory audit partner rotation and collateral. Loan_Size, CFO, and
Current_Ratio are negatively and significantly correlated with collateral. Age
and Leverage are positively and significantly correlated with collateral. The
direction of all these independent variables is consistent with prior studies. The
correlations among most of the independent variables are less than 0.5. The
correlation coefficient above 0.5 is -0.612 (Age and Industry_Dummy). The
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highest variance inflation factor is 1.912. Therefore, multicollinearity should
not be a problem in my regression.
(Insert Table 3 Panel B here)

Table 3 Panel C shows the Pearson correlation matrix for the dependent
variable and all independent variables in Equation (3). I find no change in
audit partners, but an audit firm change is positively and significantly related
to collateral. Moreover, I find mandatory audit firm rotation in this situation is
positively and significantly related to collateral. However, as I do not control
other variables that may have effects on debt financing, I cannot draw strong
inferences from the correlation table. Age and Leverage are positively and
significantly correlated with collateral. Loan_Size, CFO, and Current_Ratio
are negatively and significantly correlated with collateral. The direction of all
these independent variables is consistent with prior studies. The correlations
among most of the independent variables are less than 0.5. The correlation
coefficients

above

0.5

include

0.554

(Man_Firm_Change

and

Partner_NoChange_Firm_Change) and -0.612 (Age and Industry_Dummy).
The highest variance inflation factor is 1.964. Therefore, multicollinearity
should not be a problem in my regression.
(Insert Table 3 Panel C here)

4.3 Main results of logistic regression analyses
Table 4 presents the results for Equation (1). The total sample is 4353 firm
years. Upward audit firm change is negatively and significantly related to
collateral at the 0.05 level. This indicates that the effects of higher-quality
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audits and better quality control system on debt financing are larger than that
of higher information risks. Downward audit firm change and lateral audit firm
change are positively and significantly related to collateral at the 0.1 level.
This implies that with higher information risks and lower-quality audits or
unchanged audit quality, creditors require stricter loan terms. Since the
monitoring function of auditors is compromised, creditors more likely require
collateral for those companies with audit firms in downward or lateral changes.
In case of an audit partner change, creditors also require stricter loan term as
an audit partner change implies higher financial reporting uncertainties and
risks. However, I cannot find any evidence on the relationship between
mandatory audit firm rotation and collateral. Age and Leverage are
significantly and positively related to collateral at the 0.01 level. Loan_Size is
significantly and negatively related to collateral at the 0.01 level. CFO is
significantly and negatively related to collateral at the 0.05 level. The direction
of the aforementioned control variables is consistent with prior studies.
(Insert Table 4 here)

Table 5 presents the results for Equation (2). The total sample is 3555 firm
years. To avoid the confounding effect of audit firm changes, the situations of
an audit firm change with an audit partner change and no change in audit
partners but with an audit firm change are eliminated. An audit partner change
without an audit firm change is significantly and positively related to collateral
at the 0.05 level. This implies that creditors perceive higher information risks
and uncertainties for those companies with an audit partner change. Further,
this indicates that creditors perceive that an audit partner change is a kind of
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“opinion shopping” and hence they require stricter loan terms for those
companies. However, I cannot find any evidence on the relationship between
mandatory audit partner rotation and collateral. Age and Leverage are
significantly and positively related to collateral at the 0.01 level. Loan_Size is
significantly and negatively related to collateral at the 0.01 level. CFO is
significantly and negatively related to collateral at the 0.05 level. The direction
of the aforementioned control variables is consistent with prior studies.
(Insert Table 5 here)

Table 6 presents the results for Equation (3). The total sample is 1799 firm
years. To avoid the confounding effect of audit partner changes, the situations
of an audit firm change with an audit partner change and an audit partner
change without an audit firm change are eliminated. No change in audit
partners, but an audit firm change is significantly and positively related to
collateral at the 0.1 level. This implies that creditors consider that this kind of
change will lead to higher information risks and will lead to a higher risk of
familiarity threat. However, I cannot find any evidence on the relationship
between mandatory audit firm rotation and collateral. Age and Leverage are
significantly and positively related to collateral at the 0.01 level. Loan_Size
and CFO are significantly and negatively related to collateral at the 0.01 level.
The direction of the aforementioned control variables is consistent with prior
studies.
(Insert Table 6 here)
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Chapter 5. Sensitivity Tests
5.1 Loan maturity as the dependent variable
Loan maturity is used as a dependent variable to check the robustness of the
main findings. Similar to the requirement of a collateral, shorter loan maturity
implies a stricter loan term, as lenders perceive a higher risk of loan. As a
result, borrowers will be less flexible in the use of cash flows. I use linear
regression to test the hypotheses.

Loan_Maturity = 𝛽𝛽0+ 𝛽𝛽1Firm_Change + 𝛽𝛽2Man_Firm_Change +
𝛽𝛽3Partner_Change + Control + ε

(4)

Loan_Maturity = 𝛽𝛽0 + 𝛽𝛽1Firm_Down/Lateral + 𝛽𝛽2Man_Firm_Change +

𝛽𝛽3Partner_Change + Control + ε
(5)

Loan_Maturity = 𝛽𝛽0 + 𝛽𝛽1Partner_Change_Firm_NoChange +
𝛽𝛽2Man_Partner_Change + Control + ε
(6)

Loan_Maturity = 𝛽𝛽0 + 𝛽𝛽1Partner_NoChange_Firm_Change +
𝛽𝛽2Man_Firm_Change + Control + ε
(7)

Loan_Maturity is the length of the loan term. Firm_Change is coded as one
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if there is an audit firm change and zero otherwise. Firm_Down/Lateral is
coded as one if an audit firm changes from Big N to non-Big N, Big N to Big
N, and non-Big N to non-Big N and zero otherwise.
Since the sample size of upward audit firm change is not large enough
(n=18), I test the effect of all audit firm changes in Equation (4). There are
2210 observations. Table 7 presents the results for all audit firm changes on
loan maturity. Firm_Change is significantly and negatively related to loan
maturity at the 0.05 level. Creditors give shorter loan maturity to those
companies with an audit firm change. This indicates that creditors consider
companies with an audit firm change as having a higher information
uncertainty and risk. Partner_Change is negatively and significantly related to
loan maturity at the 0.1 level. Creditors perceive the effect of enhancing audit
independence being smaller than the effect of increasing information risks.
However, I cannot find any evidence on the relationship between mandatory
audit firm rotation and loan maturity. These results are consistent with the
main findings.
(Insert Table 7 here)

In the main test, I find the upward audit firm changes being negatively
related to collateral. To exclude the effect of upward audit firm changes on
loan maturity, I exclude upward audit firm changes in Equation (5). There are
2192 samples. Table 8 presents the results for Equation (5). Downward and
lateral audit firm changes are significantly and negatively related to loan
maturity at the 0.05 level, which is consistent with the results in the main test
and the results in Equation (4).
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(Insert Table 8 here)

Table 9 presents the results for Equation (6). There are 1772 samples. An
audit partner change without an audit firm change is significantly and
negatively related to loan maturity at the 0.05 level. However, I cannot find
any evidence on the relationship between mandatory audit partner rotation and
loan maturity. Other control variables are broadly consistent with those
reported in prior studies. These results are consistent with the main findings.
(Insert Table 9 here)

Table 10 presents the results for Equation (7). There are 888 samples. No
change in audit partners, but an audit firm change is significantly and
negatively related to loan maturity at the 0.05 level. However, I cannot find
any evidence on the relationship between mandatory audit firm rotation and
loan maturity. Other control variables are broadly consistent with those
reported in prior studies. These results are consistent with the main findings.
(Insert Table 10 here)

5.2 Control the direction of audit firm changes in the situation of no
change in audit partners, but an audit firm change
The upward audit firm changes are significantly and negatively related to
collateral in the main results. Hence, to control the effect of upward audit firm
changes, only no change in audit partners but with an audit firm change in
downward and lateral directions is tested for both collateral and loan maturity.
No change in audit partners, but an audit firm change in downward and lateral
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directions is positively related to collateral at the 0.05 level and negatively
related to loan maturity at the 0.05 level. These results imply that creditors will
issue strict loan term to those companies with this kind of auditor changes. The
results are consistent with the main findings.
(Insert Table 11 here)
(Insert Table 12 here)

5.3 Alternative measures of audit firm changes
In the main test, Big 5 audit firms (i.e., Big 4 and BDO) are used for the
measure of audit firm changes. In the sensitivity test, Big 4 audit firms are
used for an alternative measure of audit firm changes. Since upward audit firm
changes (i.e., non-Big 4 to Big 4) are not large enough for both collateral
(n=14) and loan maturity (n=1), and the upward audit firm changes are
negatively and significantly related to collateral in the main results, only
downward and lateral audit firm changes are tested. Downward and lateral
audit firm changes are positively and significantly related to collateral at the
0.1 level and negatively and significantly related to loan maturity at the 0.05
level. This implies creditors perceive higher information risks for those
companies with this kind of change and hence they will issue strict loan term
in the loan obligation. The results are consistent with the main findings. Apart
from Big 5 audit firms, Big 10 audit firms are used for an alternative measure
of audit firm changes to check the robustness of the main test. Upward audit
firm change is negatively and significantly related to collateral at the 0.05
level and positively and significantly related to loan maturity at the 0.1 level.
Downward audit firm changes are positively and significantly related to

27

collateral at the 0.1 level and negatively and significantly related to loan
maturity at the 0.05 level. Lateral audit firm changes are positively and
significantly related to collateral at the 0.1 level and negatively and
significantly related to loan maturity at the 0.01 level. This implies creditors
perceive higher information risks for those companies with downward and
lateral audit firm changes and hence they will issue strict loan term in the loan
obligation. The results are consistent with the main findings.
(Insert Table 13 here)
(Insert Table 14 here)
(Insert Table 15 here)
(Insert Table 16 here)

5.4 Measuring the dependent variable in a change form
Dependent variable is measured in a change form to test the robustness of
the main test. Collateral is measured in a change form that a dummy variable
equal to one if bank debt is backed by stricter collateral (i.e. increase in
collateral) and zero otherwise. Upward audit firm change is negatively and
significantly related to collateral at the 0.1 level. Downward audit firm change
is positively and significantly related to collateral at the 0.05 level and lateral
audit firm change is positively and significantly related to collateral at the 0.01
level. An audit partner change without an audit firm change is significantly
and positively related to collateral at the 0.01 level. No change in audit
partners, but an audit firm change is significantly and positively related to
collateral at the 0.01 level. The results are consistent with the main findings.
(Insert Table 17 here)
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(Insert Table 18 here)
(Insert Table 19 here)

5.5 Measuring the dependent variable in a change form with firm fixed
effect
Dependent variable is measured in a change form with firm fixed effect to
test the robustness of the main test. Collateral is measured in a change form
that a dummy variable equal to one if bank debt is backed by stricter collateral
(i.e. increase in collateral), and zero otherwise. Downward and lateral audit
firm changes are positively and significantly related to collateral at the 0.01
level. An audit partner change without an audit firm change is significantly
and positively related to collateral at the 0.01 level. No change in audit
partners, but an audit firm change is significantly and positively related to
collateral at the 0.01 level. The results are broadly consistent with the main
findings.
(Insert Table 20 here)
(Insert Table 21 here)
(Insert Table 22 here)

5.6 Consideration of state-owned enterprise
Since whether a firm is a state-owned enterprise may affect the loan terms, a
dummy variable - state-owned enterprise is added to check the robustness of
the main test. Upward audit firm change is negatively and significantly related
to collateral at the 0.1 level. Downward and lateral audit firm changes are
positively and significantly related to collateral at the 0.1 level. An audit
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partner change without an audit firm change is significantly and positively
related to collateral at the 0.05 level. No change in audit partners, but an audit
firm change is significantly and positively related to collateral at the 0.1 level.
The results are consistent with the main findings.
(Insert Table 23 here)
(Insert Table 24 here)
(Insert Table 25 here)
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Chapter 6. Conclusion, Limitations and Future Research
6.1 Conclusion
Independent auditors help in reducing agency problems between companies
and users of financial statements. They serve as a monitoring function for
creditors. After several major audit scandals and frauds, the issue of ensuring
audit quality becomes a great concern for creditors, investors, regulators, and
various kinds of users of financial statements. Auditor changes can help
increase the audit independence and provide “fresh eyes” to the audit
engagement. However, auditor changes cause a loss of cumulative knowledge
for current auditors for that audit engagement, which will affect the overall
audit quality. Therefore, whether auditor changes provide useful information to
creditors, which affect loan terms in the loan obligation, is an empirical
question.
In this thesis, I have used Chinese data that enables to clarify both audit firm
and audit partner rotations. Overall, I find that debt financing is worsened by
various kinds of auditor changes including: downward audit firm changes,
lateral audit firm changes, a change in an audit partner without a change in an
audit firm, and a change in an audit firm without a change in audit partners.
This indicates that generally, auditor changes provide a signal to creditors that
the monitoring function of auditors is compromised, leading to a higher
information uncertainty and hence require stricter loan terms for those
companies with auditor changes.
The findings of this research should have important implications for users of
financial statements. Overall, since auditor changes worsen debt financing, the
financial performance of a company will be adversely affected. The

31

monitoring function of auditors will also be compromised for those companies
with auditor changes. Investors should take these aspects into consideration
before making an investment decision to avoid investment losses. Corporate
financial managers should be aware that creditors generally require stricter
loan terms for those companies with auditor changes. Stricter loan terms will
affect the financial performance of a company. Stock price and the interests of
stakeholders will also be affected. Therefore, corporate financial managers
should carefully consider the necessity and effects before changing auditors.
Auditor changes are associated with a change in debt financing. This
indicates that auditor changes are useful even for these informed creditors.
This implication also addresses the importance of expanded disclosure of
auditor changes such as the detailed reasons and circumstances of the changes.
Regulators may consider further expansion of disclosure of auditor changes in
audit reports to prevent further audit scandals.

6.2 Limitations and Future Research
There are some limitations of this thesis and there are some
recommendations for future research. First, due to the limited disclosures of
loan spread by Chinese listed companies, loan spread is not used in this thesis.
If there are more disclosures of loan spread by Chinese listed companies in the
future, loan spread can be used to have greater insights on the relationship
between auditor changes and the cost of debts.
Second, greater insights can be obtained if the specific reasons for voluntary
auditor changes could be examined. However, due to data limitation, it is
suggested that this issue can be investigated for future research if there are
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more details of the disclosure of auditor changes in the future. Hence, a more
thorough analysis on the relationship between auditor changes and debt
financing can be obtained.
Third, since the impact of voluntary and mandatory auditor changes on debt
financing may be different, it is suggested that researchers can further
investigate and analyze the reasons behind in the future. Hence, a more
comprehensive investigation on the relationship of auditor changes and debt
financing can be provided and the findings can have more implications for
investors and corporate managers.
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Table 1: Mandatory audit firm and audit partner rotations in different
jurisdictions
Audit firm rotation
Audit partner rotation
Australia

No

Yes - every 5 years

Austria

Yes - every 5 years

Belgium

Yes - every 5 years for
government-owned companies
No

Brazil

Yes - every 5 years

No

Bulgaria

No

Yes - every 5 years

Canada

No

Yes - every 7 years

China

Yes – every 5 years

Cyprus

Yes - every 5 years for
state-owned enterprises
Yes - every 7 years for banks and
every 4 years for insurance and
leasing companies
No

Czech Republic

No

Yes - every 7 years

Denmark

No

Yes - every 7 years

Finland

No

Yes - every 7 years

France

No

Yes - every 6 years

Germany

No

Yes - every 7 years

Greece

No

Yes - every 7 years

Hungary

No

Yes - every 7 years

Ireland

No

Yes - every 5 years

Italy

Yes - every 9 years

Yes - every 7 years

Latvia

No

Yes - every 7 years

Luxembourg

No

Yes - every 7 years

Malta

No

Yes - every 7 years

Poland

No

Yes - every 5 years

Portugal

No

Yes - every 7 years

Romania

No

Yes - every 7 years

Slovakia

Yes - every 5 years

Yes - every 5 years

Croatia
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Yes - every 6 years

Yes - every 7 years

Yes - every 7 years

Slovenia

Yes - every 7 years

South Korea

Yes - every 5 years for the
banking and insurance industry
No

Spain

No

Yes - every 7 years

Sweden

No

Yes - every 7 years

The Netherlands

No

Yes - every 7 years

Turkey

Yes - every 7 years

Yes - every 5 years

U.K.

Yes - every 10 years

Yes - every 5 years

U.S.

No

Yes - every 5 years

Source: EY Global Financial Services Institute 2015
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No

Table 2 Descriptive statistics
Table 2 Panel A: Descriptive statistics for Equation (1)
N

Standard
deviation

Mean

Collateral

4353

0.71

0.46

Firm_Up

4353

0.01

0.12

Firm_Down

4353

0.01

0.08

Firm_Lateral

4353

0.16

0.37

Man_Firm_Change

4353

0.05

0.21

Partner_Change

4353

0.59

0.49

Prior_MAO

4353

0.01

0.10

Age

4353

11.53

5.61

Leverage

4353

0.54

0.25

Loan_Size

4353

18.75

1.51

CFO

4353

0.03

0.08

Current_Ratio

4353

1.64

2.10

Industry_Dummy

4353

0.17

0.37
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Table 2 Panel B: Descriptive statistics for Equation (2)
N
Collateral
Partner_Change_Firm_NoChange

Mean

Standard Deviation

3555

0.69

0.46

3555

0.55

0.50

3555

0.05

0.23

3555

0.01

0.08

3555

11.63

5.66

3555

0.54

0.25

3555

18.81

1.51

3555

0.03

0.08

3555

1.63

1.87

3555

0.17

0.38

Man_Partner_Change
Prior_MAO
Age
Leverage
Loan_Size
CFO
Current_Ratio
Industry_Dummy
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Table 2 Panel C: Descriptive statistics for Equation (3)

N
Collateral
Partner_NoChange_Firm_Change

Mean

Standard Deviation

1799

0.68

0.47

1799

0.11

0.31

1799

0.04

0.19

1799

0.01

0.10

1799

11.61

5.85

1799

0.54

0.28

1799

18.81

1.54

1799

0.03

0.08

1799

1.63

1.67

1799

0.18

0.38

Man_Firm_Change
Prior_MAO
Age
Leverage
Loan_Size
CFO
Current_Ratio
Industry_Dummy
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Table 4: The effects of audit firm changes on debt financing
Expected sign

Coefficient

Sig.

Constant

?

6.873

0.000***

Firm_Up

?

-0.604

0.047**

Firm_Down

+

1.145

0.081*

Firm_Lateral

+

0.250

0.067*

Man_Firm_Change

?

-0.082

0.697

Partner_Change

+

0.128

0.094*

Prior_MAO

+

0.241

0.584

Age

+

0.036

0.000***

Leverage

+

1.249

0.000***

Loan_Size

-

-0.415

0.000***

CFO

-

-1.047

0.032**

Current_Ratio

-

-0.004

0.836

Industry_Dummy

?

-0.284

0.028**

Year dummies: Included
Cox & Snell R Square: 0.184
Nagelkerke R Square: 0.262
Dependent variable: Collateral
Upward audit firm change: 60
Downward audit firm change: 26
Lateral audit firm change: 712
No change in an audit firm: 3555
Total N: 4353
*, ** and *** denote significance at 0.10, 0.05 and 0.01 levels, respectively
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Table 5: The effect of an audit partner change without an audit firm
change on debt financing
Expected sign

Coefficient

Sig.

?

7.555

0.000***

Partner_Change_Firm_NoChange +

0.208

0.013**

Man_Partner_Change

?

-0.082

0.665

Prior_MAO

+

0.236

0.667

Age

+

0.035

0.000***

Leverage

+

1.489

0.000***

Loan_Size

-

-0.458

0.000***

CFO

-

-1.388

0.011**

Current_Ratio

-

-0.003

0.878

Industry_Dummy

?

-0.235

0.097*

Constant

Year dummies: Included
Cox & Snell R Square: 0.199
Nagelkerke R Square: 0.280
Dependent variable: Collateral
An audit partner change without an audit firm change: 1949
No change in an audit partner and no change in an audit firm: 1606
Total N: 3555
*, ** and *** denote significance at 0.10, 0.05 and 0.01 levels, respectively
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Table 6: The effect of no change in audit partners, but an audit firm
change on debt financing
Expected sign

Coefficient

Sig.

?

7.886

0.000***

Partner_NoChange_Firm_Change +

0.525

0.068*

Man_Firm_Change

?

0.560

0.203

Prior_MAO

+

-0.107

0.866

Age

+

0.037

0.006***

Leverage

+

1.237

0.001***

Loan_Size

-

-0.463

0.000***

CFO

-

-2.123

0.005***

Current_Ratio

-

-0.028

0.438

Industry_Dummy

?

-0.192

0.325

Constant

Year dummies: Included
Cox & Snell R Square: 0.201
Nagelkerke R Square: 0.281
Dependent variable: Collateral
No change in audit partners, but an audit firm change: 193
No change in an audit partner and no change in an audit firm: 1606
Total N: 1799
*, ** and *** denote significance at 0.10, 0.05 and 0.01 levels, respectively
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Table 7: The effect of all audit firm changes on loan maturity
Expected sign

Coefficient

Sig.

Constant

?

-5.730

0.000***

Firm_Change

-

-0.354

0.013**

Man_Firm_Change

?

-0.306

0.199

Partner_Change

-

-0.170

0.079*

Prior_MAO

-

-0.256

0.575

Age

-

0.004

0.710

Leverage

-

0.064

0.796

Loan_Size

+

0.423

0.000***

CFO

+

0.788

0.172

Current_Ratio

+

-0.002

0.934

Industry_Dummy

?

-0.422

0.014**

Year dummies: Included
R Square: 0.093
Adjusted R Square: 0.086
Dependent variable: Loan maturity
All audit firm changes: 438
No change in an audit firm: 1772
Total N: 2210
*, ** and *** denote significance at 0.10, 0.05 and 0.01 levels, respectively
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Table 8: The effect of downward & lateral audit firm changes on loan
maturity
Expected

Coefficient

Sig.

sign
Constant

?

-5.711

0.000***

Firm_ Down/Lateral

-

-0.354

0.015**

Man_Firm_Change

?

-0.295

0.223

Partner_Change

-

-0.168

0.085*

Prior_MAO

-

-0.260

0.569

Age

-

0.004

0.709

Leverage

-

0.070

0.777

Loan_Size

+

0.422

0.000***

CFO

+

0.774

0.181

Current_Ratio

+

-0.002

0.930

Industry_Dummy

?

-0.421

0.015**

Year dummies: Included
R Square: 0.092
Adjusted R Square: 0.085
Dependent variable: Loan maturity
Downward & lateral audit firm changes: 420
No change in an audit firm: 1772
Total N: 2192
*, ** and *** denote significance at 0.10, 0.05 and 0.01 levels, respectively
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Table 9: The effect of an audit partner change without an audit firm
change on loan maturity
Expected

Coefficient

Sig.

?

-6.079

0.000***

Partner_Change_Firm_NoChange -

-0.249

0.029**

Man_Partner_Change

?

-0.067

0.779

Prior_MAO

-

-0.141

0.824

Age

-

-0.001

0.964

Leverage

-

0.294

0.353

Loan_Size

+

0.436

0.000***

CFO

+

1.342

0.053*

Current_Ratio

+

0.004

0.901

Industry_Dummy

?

-0.464

0.021**

sign
Constant

Year dummies: Included
R Square: 0.090
Adjusted R Square: 0.082
Dependent variable: Loan maturity
An audit partner change without an audit firm change: 988
No change in an audit partner and no change in an audit firm: 784
Total N: 1772
*, ** and *** denote significance at 0.10, 0.05 and 0.01 levels, respectively
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Table 10: The effect of no change in audit partners, but an audit firm
change on loan maturity
Expected

Coefficient

Sig.

?

-5.068

0.000***

Partner_NoChange_Firm_Change -

-0.684

0.046**

Man_Firm_Change

?

-0.320

0.555

Prior_MAO

-

-0.306

0.704

Age

-

-0.013

0.529

Leverage

-

0.164

0.730

Loan_Size

+

0.404

0.000***

CFO

+

1.596

0.135

Current_Ratio

+

-0.018

0.765

Industry_Dummy

?

-0.606

0.049**

sign
Constant

Year dummies: Included
R Square: 0.080
Adjusted R Square: 0.063
Dependent variable: Loan maturity
No change in audit partners, but an audit firm change: 104
No change in an audit partner and no change in an audit firm: 784
Total N: 888
*, ** and *** denote significance at 0.10, 0.05 and 0.01 levels, respectively
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Table 11: The effect of no change in audit partners, but an audit firm
change in downward and lateral directions on debt financing
Expected

Coefficient

Sig.

?

7.963

0.000***

Partner_NoChange_Firm_Down/Lateral +

0.675

0.025**

Man_Firm_Change

?

0.421

0.348

Prior_MAO

+

-0.116

0.856

Age

+

0.037

0.007***

Leverage

+

1.250

0.001***

Loan_Size

-

-0.467

0.000***

CFO

-

-2.165

0.004***

Current_Ratio

-

-0.029

0.427

Industry_Dummy

?

-0.185

0.345

sign
Constant

Year dummies: Included
Cox & Snell R Square: 0.204
Nagelkerke R Square: 0.285
Dependent variable: Collateral
No change in audit partners, but an audit firm change in downward and lateral
directions: 191
No change in an audit partner and no change in an audit firm: 1606
Total N: 1797
*, ** and *** denote significance at 0.10, 0.05 and 0.01 levels, respectively
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Table 12: The effect of no change in audit partners, but an audit firm
change in downward and lateral directions on loan maturity
Expected

Coefficient

Sig.

?

-5.077

0.000***

Partner_NoChange_Firm_Down/Lateral -

-0.698

0.045**

Man_Firm_Change

?

-0.308

0.574

Prior_MAO

-

-0.305

0.706

Age

-

-0.013

0.534

Leverage

-

0.161

0.735

Loan_Size

+

0.405

0.000***

CFO

+

1.602

0.134

Current_Ratio

+

-0.018

0.766

Industry_Dummy

?

-0.604

0.050**

sign
Constant

Year dummies: Included
R Square: 0.080
Adjusted R Square: 0.063
Dependent variable: Loan maturity
No change in audit partners, but an audit firm change in downward and lateral
directions: 102
No change in an audit partner and no change in an audit firm: 784
Total N: 886
*, ** and *** denote significance at 0.10, 0.05 and 0.01 levels, respectively
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Table 13: The effect of downward & lateral audit firm changes (i.e., Big 4
to non-Big 4, Big 4 to Big 4, and non-Big 4 to non-Big 4) on debt financing
Expected sign
Coefficient
Sig.
Constant
Firm_Down/Lateral
Man_Firm_Change

?
+
?

6.826
0.229
-0.080

0.000***
0.076*
0.702

Partner_Change

+

0.127

0.096*

Prior_MAO

+

0.231

0.600

Age

+

0.036

0.000***

Leverage

+

1.226

0.000***

Loan_Size
CFO

-

-0.412
-1.096

0.000***
0.025**

Current_Ratio

-

-0.003

0.853

Industry_Dummy
Year dummies: Included

?

-0.286

0.026**

Cox & Snell R Square: 0.182
Nagelkerke R Square: 0.259
Dependent variable: Collateral
Downward & lateral audit firm changes: 784
No change in an audit firm: 3555
Total N: 4339
*, ** and *** denote significance at 0.10, 0.05 and 0.01 levels, respectively
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Table 14: The effect of downward & lateral audit firm changes (i.e., Big 4
to non-Big 4, Big 4 to Big 4, and non-Big 4 to non-Big 4) on loan maturity
Expected

Coefficient

Sig.

sign
Constant

?

-5.731

0.000***

Firm_Down/Lateral

-

-0.354

0.013**

Man_Firm_Change

?

-0.307

0.199

Partner_Change

-

-0.170

0.080*

Prior_MAO

-

-0.256

0.575

Age

-

0.004

0.710

Leverage

-

0.063

0.797

Loan_Size

+

0.423

0.000***

CFO

+

0.789

0.172

Current_Ratio

+

-0.002

0.934

Industry_Dummy

?

-0.422

0.014**

Year dummies: Included
R Square: 0.093
Adjusted R Square: 0.086
Dependent variable: Loan maturity
Downward & lateral audit firm changes: 437
No change in an audit firm: 1772
Total N: 2209
*, ** and *** denote significance at 0.10, 0.05 and 0.01 levels, respectively
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Table 15: The effects of audit firm changes (Big 10) on debt financing
Expected sign
Coefficient
Sig.
Constant

?

6.867

0.000***

Firm_Up

?

-0.482

0.043**

Firm_Down

+

0.662

0.057*

Firm_Lateral

+

0.262

0.060*

Man_Firm_Change

?

-0.025

0.903

Partner_Change

+

0.134

0.081*

Prior_MAO

+

0.278

0.531

Age

+

0.036

0.000***

Leverage

+

1.263

0.000***

Loan_Size

-

-0.415

0.000***

CFO

-

-1.045

0.033**

Current_Ratio

-

-0.001

0.935

Industry_Dummy

?

-0.285

0.027**

Year dummies: Included
Cox & Snell R Square: 0.184
Nagelkerke R Square: 0.263
Dependent variable: Collateral
Upward audit firm change: 108
Downward audit firm change: 76
Lateral audit firm change: 614
No change in an audit firm: 3555
Total N: 4353
*, ** and *** denote significance at 0.10, 0.05 and 0.01 levels, respectively
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Table 16: The effects of audit firm changes (Big 10) on loan maturity
Expected sign
Coefficient
Sig.
Constant

?

-5.655

0.000***

Firm_Up

?

0.469

0.081*

Firm_Down

-

-0.723

0.039**

Firm_Lateral

-

-0.498

0.001***

Man_Firm_Change

?

-0.307

0.196

Partner_Change

-

-0.181

0.061*

Prior_MAO

-

-0.297

0.513

Age

-

0.004

0.725

Leverage

-

0.076

0.756

Loan_Size

+

0.419

0.000***

CFO

+

0.846

0.142

Current_Ratio

+

-0.004

0.860

Industry_Dummy

?

-0.424

0.014**

Year dummies: Included
R Square: 0.098
Adjusted R Square: 0.091
Dependent variable: Loan maturity
Upward audit firm change: 78
Downward audit firm change: 42
Lateral audit firm change: 318
No change in an audit firm: 1772
Total N: 2210
*, ** and *** denote significance at 0.10, 0.05 and 0.01 levels, respectively
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Table 17: The effects of audit firm changes on debt financing in a change
form
Expected sign Coefficient
Sig.
Constant

?

-2.686

0.001***

Firm_Up

?

-1.950

0.057*

Firm_Down

+

1.042

0.027**

Firm_Lateral

+

0.426

0.007***

Man_Firm_Change

?

-0.311

0.290

Partner_Change

+

0.619

0.000***

Prior_MAO

+

0.100

0.840

Age

+

0.002

0.888

Leverage

+

0.730

0.011**

Loan_Size

-

0.010

0.796

CFO

-

-0.796

0.271

Current_Ratio

-

-0.019

0.679

Industry_Dummy

?

-0.190

0.388

Year dummies: Included
Cox & Snell R Square: 0.032
Nagelkerke R Square: 0.055
Dependent variable: Collateral
Upward audit firm change: 33
Downward audit firm change: 20
Lateral audit firm change: 409
No change in an audit firm: 2122
Total N: 2584
*, ** and *** denote significance at 0.10, 0.05 and 0.01 levels, respectively
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Table 18: The effect of an audit partner change without an audit firm
change on debt financing in a change form
Expected

Coefficient

Sig.

-1.986

0.037**

Partner_Change_Firm_NoChange +

0.860

0.000***

Man_Partner_Change

?

-0.225

0.400

Prior_MAO

+

0.716

0.253

Age

+

-0.005

0.738

Leverage

+

0.657

0.017**

Loan_Size

-

-0.026

0.573

CFO

-

-1.405

0.086*

Current_Ratio

-

-0.002

0.961

Industry_Dummy

?

-0.302

0.223

sign
Constant

?

Year dummies: Included
Cox & Snell R Square: 0.030
Nagelkerke R Square: 0.053
Dependent variable: Collateral
An audit partner change without an audit firm change: 1195
No change in an audit partner and no change in an audit firm: 927
Total N: 2122
*, ** and *** denote significance at 0.10, 0.05 and 0.01 levels, respectively
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Table 19: The effect of no change in audit partners, but an audit firm
change on debt financing in a change form
Expected

Coefficient

Sig.

sign
Constant

?

-0.572

0.706

Partner_NoChange_Firm_Change

+

1.524

0.000***

Man_Firm_Change

?

-0.638

0.246

Prior_MAO

+

0.569

0.491

Age

+

0.007

0.801

Leverage

+

0.588

0.070*

Loan_Size

-

-0.101

0.170

CFO

-

1.518

0.279

Current_Ratio

-

-0.087

0.518

Industry_Dummy

?

0.407

0.288

Year dummies: Included
Cox & Snell R Square: 0.052
Nagelkerke R Square: 0.102
Dependent variable: Collateral
No change in audit partners, but an audit firm change: 109
No change in an audit partner and no change in an audit firm: 927
Total N: 1036

*, ** and *** denote significance at 0.10, 0.05 and 0.01 levels, respectively
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Table 20: The effects of audit firm changes on debt financing in a change
form with firm fixed effect
Expected sign
Coefficient
Sig.
Constant

?

-36.809

1.000

Firm_Up

?

-1.418

0.248

Firm_Down

+

3.937

0.006***

Firm_Lateral

+

0.892

0.001***

Man_Firm_Change

?

-0.604

0.182

Partner_Change

+

0.788

0.000***

Prior_MAO

+

-0.960

0.448

Age

+

4.138

1.000

Leverage

+

1.178

0.143

Loan_Size

-

0.084

0.345

CFO

-

1.827

0.149

Current_Ratio

-

0.046

0.807

Year dummies: Included
Firm fixed effect: Included
Cox & Snell R Square: 0.348
Nagelkerke R Square: 0.594
Dependent variable: Collateral
Upward audit firm change: 33
Downward audit firm change: 20
Lateral audit firm change: 409
No change in an audit firm: 2122
Total N: 2584
*, ** and *** denote significance at 0.10, 0.05 and 0.01 levels, respectively
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Table 21: The effect of an audit partner change without an audit firm
change on debt financing in a change form with firm fixed effect
Expected sign

Coefficient

Sig.

?

-37.618

1.000

Partner_Change_Firm_NoChange +

1.299

0.000***

Man_Partner_Change

?

-0.590

0.159

Prior_MAO

+

-36.578

0.998

Age

+

4.230

1.000

Leverage

+

1.127

0.154

Loan_Size

-

0.069

0.545

CFO

-

0.328

0.836

Current_Ratio

-

0.331

0.164

Constant

Year dummies: Included
Firm fixed effect: Included
Cox & Snell R Square: 0.360
Nagelkerke R Square: 0.633
Dependent variable: Collateral
An audit partner change without an audit firm change: 1195
No change in an audit partner and no change in an audit firm: 927
Total N: 2122
*, ** and *** denote significance at 0.10, 0.05 and 0.01 levels, respectively
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Table 22: The effect of no change in audit partners, but an audit firm
change on debt financing in a change form with firm fixed effect
Expected sign

Coefficient

Sig.

?

-19.654

1.000

Partner_NoChange_Firm_Change +

4.456

0.000***

Man_Firm_Change

?

-1.664

0.315

Prior_MAO

+

-37.180

0.999

Age

+

-0.064

1.000

Leverage

+

3.473

0.402

Loan_Size

-

-0.238

0.349

CFO

-

3.526

0.384

Current_Ratio

-

0.758

0.486

Constant

Year dummies: Included
Firm fixed effect: Included
Cox & Snell R Square: 0.411
Nagelkerke R Square: 0.816
Dependent variable: Collateral
No change in audit partners, but an audit firm change: 109
No change in an audit partner and no change in an audit firm: 927
Total N: 1036
*, ** and *** denote significance at 0.10, 0.05 and 0.01 levels, respectively
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Table 23: The effects of audit firm changes on debt financing with SOE
Expected sign

Coefficient

Sig.

Constant

?

6.747

0.000***

Firm_Up

?

-0.595

0.052*

Firm_Down

+

1.183

0.073*

Firm_Lateral

+

0.246

0.072*

Man_Firm_Change

?

-0.064

0.763

Partner_Change

+

0.129

0.093*

Prior_MAO

+

0.208

0.636

Age

+

0.039

0.000***

Leverage

+

1.329

0.000***

Loan_Size

-

-0.407

0.000***

CFO

-

-0.954

0.052*

Current_Ratio

-

-0.004

0.841

SOE

?

-0.316

0.000***

Industry_Dummy

?

-0.324

0.012**

Year dummies: Included
Cox & Snell R Square: 0.187
Nagelkerke R Square: 0.266
Dependent variable: Collateral
Upward audit firm change: 60
Downward audit firm change: 26
Lateral audit firm change: 712
No change in an audit firm: 3555
Total N: 4353

*, ** and *** denote significance at 0.10, 0.05 and 0.01 levels, respectively
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Table 24: The effect of an audit partner change without an audit firm
change on debt financing with SOE
Expected

Coefficient

Sig.

?

7.409

0.000***

Partner_Change_Firm_NoChange +

0.207

0.014**

Man_Partner_Change

?

-0.071

0.707

Prior_MAO

+

0.201

0.713

Age

+

0.037

0.000***

Leverage

+

1.580

0.000***

Loan_Size

-

-0.449

0.000***

CFO

-

-1.259

0.022**

Current_Ratio

-

-0.003

0.899

SOE

?

-0.365

0.000***

Industry_Dummy

?

-0.283

0.048**

sign
Constant

Year dummies: Included
Cox & Snell R Square: 0.203
Nagelkerke R Square: 0.285
Dependent variable: Collateral
An audit partner change without an audit firm change: 1949
No change in an audit partner and no change in an audit firm: 1606
Total N: 3555
*, ** and *** denote significance at 0.10, 0.05 and 0.01 levels, respectively
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Table 25: The effect of no change in audit partners, but an audit firm
change on debt financing with SOE
Expected

Coefficient

Sig.

?

7.774

0.000***

Partner_NoChange_Firm_Change +

0.516

0.073*

Man_Firm_Change

?

0.583

0.186

Prior_MAO

+

-0.150

0.812

Age

+

0.039

0.004***

Leverage

+

1.349

0.000***

Loan_Size

-

-0.456

0.000***

CFO

-

-1.912

0.012**

Current_Ratio

-

-0.027

0.467

SOE

?

-0.367

0.005***

Industry_Dummy

?

-0.232

0.236

sign
Constant

Year dummies: Included
Cox & Snell R Square: 0.205
Nagelkerke R Square: 0.286
Dependent variable: Collateral
No change in audit partners, but an audit firm change: 193
No change in an audit partner and no change in an audit firm: 1606
Total N: 1799

*, ** and *** denote significance at 0.10, 0.05 and 0.01 levels, respectively
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Appendix: Definitions of all variables
Collateral

a dummy variable equal to one if bank debt
is backed by any collaterals and zero
otherwise

Firm_Up

a dummy variable equal to one if an audit
firm changes from non-Big N to Big N and
zero otherwise
Firm_Down
a dummy variable equal to one if an audit
firm changes from Big N to non-Big N and
zero otherwise
Firm_Lateral
a dummy variable equal to one with an
audit firm changes from Big N to Big N and
non-Big N to non-Big N and zero otherwise
Partner_NoChange_Firm_Change
a dummy variable equal to one in the
situation that no change in audit partners,
but an audit firm change and zero for no
change in an audit firm and audit partners
Partner_Change_Firm_NoChange
a dummy variable equal to one in the
situation that an audit partner change
without an audit firm change and zero for
no change in an audit firm and audit
partners
Man_Firm_Change
a dummy variable equal to one if there is a
mandatory audit firm change and zero
otherwise
Man_Partner_Change
a dummy variable equal to one if there is a
mandatory audit partner change and zero
otherwise
Partner_Change
a dummy variable equal to one if there is an
audit partner change and zero otherwise
Firm_Change
a dummy variable equal to one if there is an
audit firm change and zero otherwise
Partner_NoChange_Firm_Down/Lateral a dummy variable equal to one in the
situation that no change in audit partners,
but an audit firm change in downward and
lateral directions and zero for no change in
an audit firm and audit partners
Firm_ Down/Lateral
a dummy variable equal to one if an audit
firm changes from Big N to non-Big N, Big
N to Big N, and non-Big N to non-Big N
and zero otherwise
Loan_Maturity
the length of the loan term
Prior_MAO

a dummy variable equal to one if the
company received modified audit opinion
in the previous year and zero otherwise
the number of years since listed

Age
64

Leverage

total liabilities to total assets ratio

Loan_Size

a natural logarithm of the loan size

CFO

cash flows from operations scaled by total
assets
current assets to current liabilities ratio

Current_Ratio
SOE

a dummy variable equal to one if the firm is
a state-owned enterprise and zero otherwise
a dummy variable equal to one if the
company is in the manufacturing sector and
zero otherwise
Year dummies from 2007-2014

Industry_Dummy

Year dummies
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